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Jurors tend to place a great deal of emphasis on wit-
ness confidence in determining witness credibility (Cut-
ler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990; Fox & Walters, 1986; Luus 
& Wells, 1994b). Previous research, though, has indi-
cated that witness confidence is only a weak (albeit sta-
tistically reliable) predictor of accuracy, with participants 
generally being overconfident (Berger & Herringer, 
1991; Sharp, Cutler, & Penrod, 1988; Smith, Kassin, & 
Ellsworth, 1989; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). 
In addition, confidence and accuracy are influenced 
by different factors (Luus & Wells, 1994a). This pres-
ents a problem, in that jurors may be placing too much 
emphasis on testimony that is not reliable (Lindsay, 
1994). What is needed is a better way to predict witness 
accuracy.
One possible way would be to determine character-
istics of witnesses that are predictive of their accuracy. 
Deffenbacher (1991) reviewed the literature on the ef-
fect of various demographic characteristics on eyewit-
ness reliability and concluded that, with the exception 
of age, they have only a negligible effect. Deffenbacher 
concluded that personality traits also have little power to 
predict either face recognition or event recall, although 
more recent research (e.g., Hosch, 1994; Kassin, Rigby, 
& Castillo, 1991) has been somewhat more promising 
in this respect. For example, Hosch found that high self-
monitors are better at face recognition than low self-
monitors and that elements of cognitive style, such as 
field independence, may be predictive of eyewitness ac-
curacy as well. However, evidence supporting the effect 
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If the relationship between confidence and accuracy extended across domains, then one could assess perfor-
mance in a known domain and use it to estimate performance in another domain. The stability of the confi-
dence-accuracy relationship across the domains of eyewitness memory and general knowledge was investi-
gated. The major findings of Experiment 1 were that in both domains participants were overconfident, yet more 
confident on correct than on incorrect responses, and that the degrees of overconfidence, calibration, and res-
olution in the 2 domains were positively correlated. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and showed that 
feedback about overconfidence reduced overall confidence levels but did not improve calibration or resolution. 
The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of metamemory and individual differences.
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of cognitive styles is mixed (Christiaansen, Ochalek, & 
Sweeney, 1984; Hosch, 1994).
Another possible way to ascertain how well one’s 
accuracy matches up with one’s confidence would be 
to determine a witness’s confidence–accuracy (C-A) 
relationship in another domain. The most common 
domain, other than eyewitness memory (EM), used 
for testing the C-A relationship is participants’ confi-
dence in their general, factual knowledge (e.g., Koriat 
& Goldsmith, 1996; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 
1980; Liberman & Tversky, 1993; Sniezek, Paese, & 
Switzer, 1990). The most prevalent finding of these 
studies is that, as in EM, confidence is a weakly re-
liable predictor of accuracy, with participants gener-
ally being overconfident (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & 
Phillips, 1982). Attempts to discover individual differ-
ences in the C-A relationship for general knowledge 
(GK) questions have also been largely unsuccessful 
(Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Nelson, 1988; Thompson & 
Mason, 1996).
There are many ways to measure the C-A relation-
ship, but they generally fall under the headings of either 
“absolute” or “relative” monitoring effectiveness (Koriat 
& Goldsmith, 1996; Liberman & Tversky, 1993; Nelson, 
1996; Yaniv, Yates, & Smith, 1991). Absolute measures 
refer to the correspondence between a person’s subjec-
tive confidence and the proportion correct, such as over/
underconfidence and calibration. Over/underconfidence 
compares a person’s mean confidence rating to that per-
son’s overall accuracy. For example, someone who an-
swers 50% of a set of questions correctly but whose 
mean confidence rating for that set of questions is 80% 
would be considered overconfident. In the case of cali-
bration, 1 a person would be well calibrated if approx-
imately 70% of all confidence judgments of 70% were 
actually correct. The main difference between calibra-
tion and over/underconfidence is that the former uses 
the mean of the squared deviations, whereas the latter 
simply uses the mean deviation. As such, the over/un-
derconfidence measure provides the direction of the re-
lationship in addition to the magnitude, as provided by 
calibration.
Neither of these two measures is able to assess the ex-
tent to which confidence distinguishes correct from in-
correct answers, which is the hallmark of relative mon-
itoring measures. Resolution accomplishes this purpose 
by correlating a person’s subjective confidence with the 
correctness of each answer. According to Nelson (1984), 
the best available measure of resolution is the Good-
man–Kruskal gamma correlation, γ. Confidence is pos-
itively correlated with accuracy if it is greater for correct 
than for incorrect responses.
Most of the previous research addressing the C-A 
relationship has been concerned with absolute mon-
itoring effectiveness, particularly the finding of over-
confidence. However, as can be seen from the above 
discussion, absolute monitoring effectiveness is some-
thing quite different from relative monitoring effective-
ness (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). The difference be-
tween the two can be illustrated by people who assign 
the same confidence level to all of their answers, such 
as 50%. If these people answered half of a set of ques-
tions correctly, then they would show good absolute 
monitoring effectiveness: They are neither over- nor 
underconfident (mean confidence and overall accuracy 
both equal 50%), and they are also perfectly calibrated. 
However, they would exhibit extremely poor relative 
monitoring effectiveness because the correct and incor-
rect responses would both have the exact same confi-
dence ratings.
Despite findings of overconfidence in both the eye-
witness and GK areas, surprisingly little research has 
addressed the relationship between the two domains. 
Perfect and colleagues (Perfect & Hollins, 1996; Per-
fect, Watson, & Wagstaff, 1993) compared participants’ 
performance on eyewitness and GK questionnaires. 
They found that participants were equally overconfi-
dent in both domains; however, they did not assess the 
stability of overconfidence across domains within in-
dividual participants. Some support for the notion of 
cross-domain stability comes from a study by West and 
Stanovich (1997), who found a significantly positive 
correlation between participants’ degrees of overcon-
fidence in their performance on a GK and on a motor 
skill task.
Along these same lines, Nelson and Narens (1990) 
termed the ascription of confidence judgments to infor-
mation that is retrieved from memory—which is what 
1 The Brier score partition for calibration is 1/N Σ n(r − c)2 
, where N is the total number of probability assessments, n 
is the number of probabilities for each category, r is the nu-
merical value of the probabilities for each category, and c is 
the proportion of probabilities for each category that were at-
tached to the correct alternative.
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participants in eyewitness studies are typically asked 
to do—retrospective metamemory. They identified sys-
tematic processes in how people make such judgments 
about the contents of their memories. Thus, moni-
toring effectiveness in the eyewitness domain can be 
construed as part and parcel of a larger system that is 
involved in monitoring memory’s contents. Overconfi-
dence in such metamemory judgments might be a rela-
tively stable individual characteristic, similar to cogni-
tive styles such as field independence (Hosch, 1994). If 
there is a relationship between the degree of overcon-
fidence in the EM domain and the other domain that 
is used, one could see whether a person was generally 
over- or underconfident and then generalize to the wit-
nessed event.
The present experiments are an attempt to extend re-
search on the C-A relationship by exploring the stabil-
ity of individuals’ absolute and relative monitoring ef-
fectiveness across domains. Of special interest is the 
question of whether individuals who are good monitors 
in one domain will likewise tend to be good monitors in 
the other domain. Finally, we seek to extend the findings 
of cross-domain stability (West & Stanovich, 1997) by 
examining the effect that feedback in one domain has on 
performance in the other domain.
Experiment 1
Given that overconfidence has been found for both 
GK questions and EM, the main purpose of this study 
was to determine whether individuals would be stable 
in their absolute monitoring (i.e., calibration and over/
underconfidence) and relative monitoring effectiveness 
(i.e., resolution) across domains. Participants witnessed 
a naturalistic event in which two confederates made an-
nouncements (cf. Christiaansen et al., 1984). They then 
completed two unrelated questionnaires, one for GK and 
one for EM.
On the basis of previous research, we predicted that 
participants would be overconfident in both the GK do-
main (Koriat et al., 1980; Liberman & Tversky, 1993; 
Sniezek et al., 1990) and the eyewitness domain (Berger 
& Herringer, 1991; Perfect et al., 1993; Smith et al., 
1989; Sporer et al., 1995). Second, on the basis of re-
search in both domains showing participants generally 
to be more confident on correct responses than on in-
correct responses (Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 
1987; Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Smith et al., 1989), we 
predicted positive gamma correlations for both GK and 
memory for witnessed details. Third, research that has 
found consistency in overconfidence across different 
domains (e.g., West & Stanovich, 1997) led us to pre-
dict that participants’ absolute monitoring effective-
ness would be stable across the two domains. Finally, 
although some research has failed to find evidence of sta-
bility in resolution across items within a single domain 
(Nelson, 1988; Thompson & Mason, 1996), findings of 
stable, systematic processes in people’s monitoring abil-
ities in general (Nelson & Narens, 1990)—coupled with 
the role of personality variables in EM (Hosch, 1994)—
led us to the somewhat more tentative prediction of a 
positive correlation across domains for relative monitor-
ing effectiveness.
Method
Participants
Participants were volunteers from an introductory 
psychology course at Louisiana State University who re-
ceived extra course credit. Of the 181 participants who 
completed the GK questionnaire in Phase 1 of the study, 
64 did not provide complete data for analysis, leaving 
117 participants for the main analyses.2 These partici-
pants’ performance on the GK questionnaire in Phase 1 
was compared with that of the 64 participants who were 
dropped or who did not show up for Phase 2; this com-
parison yielded no significant differences. Although par-
ticipants were informed that they would only receive 
credit for participating in both phases, they were not 
otherwise forewarned of the importance of the second 
2 A total of 14 participants were dropped for providing unus-
able data, and 50 participants did not attend Phase 2 of the ex-
periment. Although the number of participants from Phase 1 
who did not appear for Phase 2 seems high, it is actually bet-
ter than the department-wide show-up rate (about 55%) for 
the semester in which this study was conducted. Another pos-
sible reason for this attrition rate may be because Phase 1 was 
conducted in the first class meeting of the semester, and some 
of the participants may have dropped the class before Phase 2, 
thus having no incentive for the extra credit they would have 
received. The relatively high attrition rate is rectified in Ex-
periment 2.
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phase. This was done to keep the study as naturalistic as 
possible, but it may also explain the relatively high attri-
tion rate.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in two phases: a GK 
phase followed by an EM phase. In Phase 1, two con-
federates addressed an introductory psychology class. 
One confederate was introduced by the instructor and 
made an announcement. That confederate then intro-
duced the other confederate, who administered the GK 
questionnaire. The participants were exposed to both 
confederates for about 25 min, and each confederate 
spoke for approximately the same amount of time. In 
Phase 2, at intervals of either 2 (N = 70), 5 (N = 22), or 
7 (N = 25) days later, participants were given the EM 
questionnaire.3
Materials
The study included two measures: A GK question-
naire and an EM questionnaire. Both questionnaires 
consisted of 46 four-alternative forced-choice questions. 
Each question was followed by a confidence scale that 
ranged from 25% (the probability of a correct response 
by guessing) to 100% by intervals of five. The questions 
represented a range of difficulty from 7% to 75% correct 
for the GK questionnaire and from 3% to 100% for the 
EM questionnaire.
The following are examples of the GK and EM 
questions: 
GK: Ambergris comes from a: 
A. Cow  B. Sperm Whale
C. Antelope  D. Elephant 
EM: The color of the speaker’s shirt was: 
A. Blue   B. Gray 
C. Green  D. Red
The correct answers to the questions concerning the tar-
gets’ physical appearance were established by a pilot 
group while viewing the target individuals. 
Results
The participants’ overall mean percentage correct 
and mean confidence were computed for each mea-
sure. These means are presented in Table 1, which also 
shows mean confidence levels on the correct and incor-
rect responses, mean calibration scores (in all analyses, 
this score refers to the calibration component of the 
Brier partition; see Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977), 
and mean Goodman–Kruskal gamma correlations for 
each measure. One-way analyses of variance failed to 
find differences on any of the eyewitness measures that 
were due to delay, Fs(2, 115) < 1.6, ps > .05, so the 
data were collapsed across delay intervals for further 
analysis. 
GK Questionnaire
Overall means of confidence and accuracy indicated 
overconfidence on the GK questionnaire, with partici-
pants being 16% more confident on average than they 
were accurate. The mean calibration score was .26 (SD 
= .07). A calibration curve was constructed with confi-
dence levels being collapsed with the next highest level, 
such that 25% and 30% were combined, 35% and 40% 
were combined, and so forth. This curve, shown in Fig-
ure 1, indicates overconfidence at every level. The 
gamma correlations ranged from −1.00 to .80, M = .21, 
SD = .28, p < .01. 
 
EM Questionnaire
Overall means of confidence and accuracy indicated 
overconfidence on the EM questionnaire as well, with 
participants being 19% more confident on average than 
they were accurate. The mean calibration score was .28 
(SD = .07). Although participants were both more con-
fident and more accurate on the EM questionnaire than 
on the GK questionnaire, their global overconfidence 
and calibration scores on both questionnaires were very
3 For the sake of realism, participants also made two lineup 
identifications. Because it is not possible to compute within-
subject measures of the C-A relationship for the lineup identi-
fications (unless a very large number of lineups are used), the 
lineup results are not reported.
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similar. A calibration curve was constructed in the same 
manner as for the GK scores (see Figure 1). This curve 
also shows overconfidence, except at the lowest confi-
dence level, for which there were very few responses. 
The gamma correlations ranged from −.14 to .76, M = 
.41, SD = .17, p < .01.
Correlation Between GK and EM Questionnaire 
Performance
The overall degree of overconfidence was approxi-
mately the same in the two domains: 16% for the GK 
questionnaire and 19% for the EM questionnaire. Cor-
relations were computed between the two domains for 
participants’ mean confidence, mean accuracy, overcon-
fidence, calibration, and gamma correlation (see Table 
2). As predicted, significant positive correlations were 
found between the GK and EM questionnaires for the 
absolute monitoring measures (overconfidence, r = .34, 
p < .01; calibration, r = .38, p < .01), as well as the rel-
ative monitoring measure of gamma (r = .16, p < .01). 
There was also a significant positive correlation for av-
erage confidence, r = .33, p < .01, but not for average 
accuracy, r = .09. 
Table 1. Mean Accuracy, Confidence, Calibration, and Gamma Correlations for Experiments 1 and 2
                                                                         Experiment 1                                         Experiment 2
                                                        GK                        EM                           GK                        EM
Measure                                              M            SD             M           SD            M            SD           M            SD  
  
Accuracy (%) 31  8   55   8 47 50 50 50
Confidence (%)  47  13   74   11 58 28 60 28
Correct responses (%)  52  15   80   11  68 8 68 8
Incorrect responses (%)  45  14   68   13 50 6 52 6
Calibration score  .26  .07   .28   .07 .25 .05 .26 .08
Gamma correlation   .21 .28   .41  .17 .41 .18 .42 .27
Note. Ns = 117 for Experiment 1 and 96 for Experiment 2. Calibration scores could range from 0 to 1, with lower scores 
indicating better calibration. GK = General Knowledge questionnaire; EM = Eyewitness Memory questionnaire.
Figure 1. Calibration curves for the General Knowledge (GK) and Eyewitness 
Memory (EM) questionnaires for Experiment 1
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Discussion
Consistent with previous research, participants were 
overconfident in answering questions about both im-
personal facts (e.g., Lichtenstein et al., 1982) and per-
sonally witnessed events (e.g., Smith et al., 1989). They 
were correct on 31% of their answers to GK questions, 
yet their mean confidence rating was 47%. Likewise, 
they were correct on 55% of their answers to questions 
about the witnessed event, yet their mean confidence rat-
ing was 74%. Thus, participants were, on average, 16% 
and 19% overconfident in the GK and EM domains, 
respectively.
Although previous research has found similar de-
grees of overconfidence in GK and EM (Perfect & Hol-
lins, 1996; Perfect et al., 1993), the stability of partici-
pants’ performance across these domains has not been 
assessed. The main finding of Experiment 1 is that the 
same participants who were good monitors in one do-
main tended to be good monitors in the other domain as 
well. Specifically, the measures of both relative monitor-
ing (i.e., resolution) and absolute monitoring (i.e., over-
confidence and calibration) effectiveness were positively 
correlated across domains. Of interest, mean confidence 
was also positively correlated across domains, whereas 
mean accuracy was not. This finding seems to indicate 
that participants were merely consistent in their assign-
ment of confidence values, which could account for the 
positive correlations for the measures of absolute moni-
toring effectiveness. Although this interpretation can ex-
plain the consistency in absolute monitoring effective-
ness, the significant positive correlation for resolution 
between the GK and EM domains indicates that partic-
ipants for whom differences in confidence reliably pre-
dicted differences in accuracy on one task also tended 
to show good relative monitoring ability on the other 
task. Thus, participants were not consistent merely in 
their tendency to use similar confidence values across 
domains. As a whole, these results suggest that the rela-
tionship between an individual’s confidence judgments 
and accuracy, in terms of both absolute and relative 
monitoring effectiveness, is relatively stable across dif-
ferent tasks (cf. West & Stanovich, 1997).
A practical application of the findings from Experi-
ment 1 would be to present witnesses with feedback, 
which they would then be able to take into account 
while testifying. The capacity of feedback to ameliorate 
the general finding of overconfidence, and potentially to 
improve witnesses’ relative monitoring effectiveness as 
well, was the primary focus of Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, participants were overconfident for 
both GK and EM questions. Furthermore, both calibra-
tion and resolution were found to be moderately cor-
related across tasks, suggesting a common underlying 
mechanism controlling performance on both tasks. Ex-
periment 2 was designed to determine whether receiving 
feedback on GK performance would lead participants to 
reduce their overconfidence and become more effective 
memory monitors on an independent task involving EM.
The procedure was very similar to that of Experiment 
1, but several methodological changes were made in or-
der to clarify and extend the results. First, the nature of 
the witnessed event was changed. In Experiment 1, the 
witnessed event was a live event that had been combined 
with the GK questionnaire (i.e., part of the witnessed 
event was the administration of the GK questionnaire). 
For Experiment 2, the witnessed event was changed to 
a videotaped clip from a movie. This was done both to 
Table 2. Correlations (Pearson’s r) Between Performance on the General Knowledge (GK) 
and Eyewitness Memory (EM) Questionnaires
                                                                                             Over/                   Gamma
Experiment    Calibration    Accuracy    Confidence    Underconfidence      correlation
 1  .38** .09 .33** .34* .16*
 2  .32** .16 .49** .17* .24
Note. Over/underconfidence is the difference of mean confidence minus mean accuracy.
Ns = 117 for Experiment 1 and 96 for Experiment 2.
*p < .05, one-tailed. **p < .001, one-tailed.
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separate the witnessed event from the GK task and to 
assess the findings’ generalizability to a different ex-
perimental eyewitness context (cf. Tollestrup, Turtle, & 
Yuille, 1994).
The next changes from Experiment 1 concerned de-
lay and participant attrition. Because delay did not sig-
nificantly affect performance on the EM questionnaire in 
Experiment 1, only a 2-day delay was used for Exper-
iment 2. Additionally, the manner of recruiting partici-
pants was altered slightly (see Participants below), re-
sulting in a reduction in the attrition rate.
In the final change from Experiment 1, prior to an-
swering questions about the witnessed event, some par-
ticipants received feedback concerning their performance 
on the GK questionnaire. Previous studies on the effect 
of feedback on the C-A relationship have been mixed, 
depending on the measure used. Some studies have 
shown that feedback improves resolution but not cali-
bration (Baranski & Petrusic, 1994; Sharp et al., 1988). 
However, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) found the 
opposite result, with feedback improving calibration but 
not resolution. Subbotin (1996) also found that feedback 
improved calibration but only for easy items (resolution 
was not examined in this study). In light of these differ-
ences, it is difficult to predict whether calibration, res-
olution, or both would be improved through feedback. 
A common finding, however, is that feedback is capable 
of improving performance (albeit not consistently in all 
respects).
We used two types of feedback: general feedback, 
which informed participants of the common findings re-
garding overconfidence, and specific feedback, which 
informed them that they themselves had been overcon-
fident in the first phase of the experiment. We made two 
predictions: (a) that feedback would reduce overconfi-
dence in the eyewitness phase of the experiment, com-
pared with a control condition with no feedback, and (b) 
that any improvements would be more marked in the 
specific feedback condition than in the general feedback 
condition. This second prediction was made because of 
the heightened relevance of the specific feedback to par-
ticipants’ own behavior.
It is less clear whether feedback (general or spe-
cific) about overconfidence would also improve partic-
ipants’ calibration and resolution, as it could lead them 
to become less confident without any corresponding im-
provement in how differences in confidence predict dif-
ferences in accuracy. However, because the feedback 
might have the overall effect of making participants 
more thoughtful in using confidence judgments when 
monitoring their memory performance, we hypothesized 
that it would improve calibration and resolution as well. 
As this hypothesis was somewhat tentative, we expected 
that the feedback about overconfidence would affect par-
ticipants’ calibration and resolution less than their de-
gree of over/underconfidence.
Method
Participants
Participants were volunteers from undergradu-
ate psychology courses at Louisiana State University 
who signed up to participate in an experiment for extra 
course credit. Of the 113 participants who completed the 
GK questionnaire in Phase 1 of the study, 17 did not par-
ticipate in the EM questionnaire in Phase 2, leaving 96 
participants for the main analyses. This attrition rate of 
15% is much lower than in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 in that 
it occurred in two phases. In Phase 1, participants, in 
groups of up to 20, viewed a video clip on a 25-in. mon-
itor and then filled out a GK questionnaire. Participants 
were instructed to pay close attention to the video be-
cause they might be asked about it later. Participants 
then came back 2 days later for Phase 2. During the de-
lay, the GK questionnaires were scored, and participants 
were assigned to feedback conditions. In Phase 2, par-
ticipants were given the EM questionnaire concerning 
the video, with the first page containing the feedback in-
structions. Because gains made from feedback have been 
found to occur following the first feedback session (Li-
chtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980), only this single instance 
of feedback was given.
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Materials and Design
The GK and EM questionnaires were similar in struc-
ture to Experiment 1, but different in content. Specifi-
cally, the number of questions on both questionnaires 
was increased to 50, and the difficulty of the two ques-
tionnaires was equated through pilot testing. (The over-
all accuracy rates for the two questionnaires in Experi-
ment 1 were considerably different—31% for GK, 56% 
for EM—though performance in both domains was sig-
nificantly better than chance.) Furthermore, the wit-
nessed event was changed from a live to a videotaped 
event.
At the beginning of the EM questionnaire was an in-
struction page that contained one of three feedback con-
ditions: specific, general, or no feedback. In the specific 
feedback condition, participants were told that their GK 
questionnaire had been scored in order to provide feed-
back and that they had been overconfident in their an-
swers. In the general feedback condition, participants 
were told that some of the participants’ GK question-
naires had been scored in order to give them feedback 
about their performance but that theirs had not been 
scored. They were then told that most people tended to 
be overconfident in their answers. The no-feedback (con-
trol) instructions simply told participants that the fol-
lowing questions concerned the video they had watched 
on the first day. Participant triads were matched on their 
calibration scores on the GK questionnaire, with mem-
bers of each triad randomly assigned to feedback condi-
tions. This matching process ensured that participants in 
the different feedback conditions did not differ in their 
calibration on the GK questionnaire, F(2, 93) = .331, p 
> .05.
The witnessed event was a clip about 3½ min long 
from a popular film. The clip was chosen because it con-
tained a fair amount of dialogue and no violence. The 
correct answers to questions about the film were deter-
mined by unanimous agreement among four raters.
Results
The participants’ overall mean accuracy and mean 
confidence were computed for each task. These means 
are presented in Table 1, which also shows mean con-
fidence levels on the correct and incorrect responses, 
mean calibration scores, and mean gamma correlations 
for each task.
GK Questionnaire
Overall means of confidence and accuracy indicated 
overconfidence on the GK questionnaire, with partici-
pants being 11% more confident on average than they 
were accurate. The mean calibration score was .25 (SD 
= .05). Mean confidence and accuracy were both higher 
than in Experiment 1, whereas calibration scores were 
about the same. A calibration curve was constructed as 
in Experiment 1 (see Figure 2). This curve indicates 
overconfidence at every level except the lowest confi-
dence level. The gamma correlations ranged from −.19 
to .77, with a mean of .41 (SD = .18), p < .01. 
Figure 2. Calibration curves for the General Knowledge (GK) and Eyewitness Memory 
(EM) questionnaires for Experiment 2
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EM Questionnaire
Overall performance. Overall means for confidence 
and accuracy indicated overconfidence on the EM ques-
tionnaire as well, with a mean overconfidence of 10%. 
The mean calibration score was .26 (SD = .08). These 
figures correspond closely to the GK questionnaire. A 
calibration curve (see Figure 2) also shows overconfi-
dence, except at the lowest confidence level. The gamma 
correlations ranged from −.64 to 1.0, with a mean of .42 
(SD = .27), p < .01.
Feedback. Separate analyses of covariance on eye-
witness confidence, accuracy, calibration, gamma, and 
over/underconfidence were conducted, with feedback 
as a between-subjects factor. Although feedback groups 
had been equated for calibration on the GK question-
naire, GK accuracy was included as a covariate in all of 
these analyses to control for any possible variations on 
this dimension. Type of feedback did not have an effect 
on eyewitness accuracy, calibration, or gamma (Fs < 1), 
but it did have a significant effect on confidence, F(2, 
92) = 8.79, p < .01, and over/underconfidence, F(2, 92) 
= 7.56, p = .01. Planned comparisons showed that par-
ticipants who received either kind of feedback had sig-
nificantly lower confidence levels than participants who 
received no feedback (Ms = 56% vs. 69%), t(93) = 4.46, 
p < .01, and were also less overconfident (Ms = 6% vs. 
17%), t(93) = 2.72, p < .01. There was no significant dif-
ference in confidence between the general (M = 58%) 
and specific (M = 54%) feedback conditions, t(93) = 
1.09, p > .05; however, participants in the specific feed-
back condition were marginally less overconfident (Ms 
= 2% vs. 10%), t(93) = 1.92, p < .08.
Correlations Between GK and EM Questionnaire 
Performance
Because the eyewitness calibration scores and 
gamma correlations in Experiment 2 did not differ 
across feedback conditions, all three feedback condi-
tions were collapsed for computing correlations be-
tween domains (see Table 2). As in Experiment 1, 
significant correlations between the GK and EM ques-
tionnaires were found for both mean confidence and 
overconfidence, r = .49, p < .01, and r = .17, p < .05, 
respectively. The correlation between domains for ac-
curacy was marginally significant, r = .16, p < .07. As 
in Experiment 1, there were also significant, positive 
correlations between calibration and gamma on the EM 
and GK questionnaires, r = .32, p < .01, and r = .24, p 
< .01, respectively.
Discussion
The main result of Experiment 2 is the replication 
of the significant positive correlations for overconfi-
dence, calibration, and resolution between the GK and 
EM questionnaires. A second important finding is that, 
compared to those who did not receive any feedback, 
participants who were given feedback regarding over-
confidence on the GK questionnaire had lower aver-
age confidence and overconfidence scores on the EM 
questionnaire. This reduction occurred whether the 
feedback indicated that they in particular were over-
confident or that people in general were overconfident. 
However, this reduction in confidence was not accom-
panied by a corresponding improvement in calibration 
or resolution. Feedback that was expressed not just in 
terms of overconfidence but that specifically addressed 
calibration or resolution, or both, might improve these 
measures of monitoring effectiveness as well (Lichten-
stein & Fischhoff, 1980; Sharp et al., 1988; Subbotin, 
1996).
General Discussion
In the present experiments, the relationship between 
participants’ confidence in their memories and the ac-
curacy of those memories was assessed in two differ-
ent domains: GK and EM. In both experiments, par-
ticipants’ confidence in their responses exceeded their 
accuracy in both domains, supporting previous research 
showing that people believe they know more than they 
actually do about impersonal facts (e.g., Lichtenstein et 
al., 1982) and personally witnessed events (e.g., Smith 
et al., 1989; Sporer et al., 1995). More important, the de-
gree to which participants were good monitors was pos-
itively correlated in the two domains. Much of this con-
sistency reflected participants’ tendency to use similar 
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confidence ratings across domains; that is, participants’ 
confidence judgments, and not just their degree of over-
confidence, were correlated across domains. This con-
sistent use of confidence may account for the stability 
of absolute monitoring effectiveness (i.e., calibration 
and over/underconfidence) across domains; however, it 
cannot explain the stability in participants’ resolution 
scores.
The domains used in the present experiments can be 
said to draw on distinct memory systems: EM involves 
episodic memory, which contains experiential mem-
ory of events, whereas GK involves semantic memory, 
which contains abstract knowledge of facts (Tulving, 
1983). Tulving has catalogued the extensive differences, 
as well as the similarities, between these two mem-
ory systems. For example, they are proposed to dif-
fer in their source and mode of operation, but they are 
alike in that they both contain information that is prop-
ositional in nature and that can be modified as a result 
of mental activity (Tulving, 1983, chap. 3). The results 
of the present experiments suggest that another similar-
ity between these two kinds of memory is in people’s 
metaknowledge of the information that is held in ep-
isodic and semantic memory. The major finding of the 
present experiments was that the relationship between 
participants’ confidence and accuracy—in the sense of 
over/underconfidence, calibration, and resolution—was 
consistent across domains. Although metamemory has 
been applied primarily to semantic knowledge (Nelson 
& Narens, 1990), this finding suggests that it may op-
erate similarly regardless of the type of knowledge that 
is being monitored. Although some research has failed 
to find much stability in individuals’ metamemory judg-
ments (Nelson, 1988; Thompson & Mason, 1996), both 
absolute and relative monitoring ability thus appear to 
be relatively stable characteristics in making confidence 
judgments across the domains of GK and EM. The sta-
bility of metamemory across other tasks also awaits fu-
ture research.
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that witness 
overconfidence can be reduced by informing witnesses 
that people in general (or they themselves) tend to be 
overconfident. Participants who received such feedback 
about their performance on the GK questionnaire were 
significantly less confident in their eyewitness reports 
than participants who received no feedback. Unfortu-
nately, the feedback did not improve calibration or res-
olution. In other words, feedback about overconfidence 
did not affect how well variations in confidence pre-
dicted variations in accuracy, despite having the overall 
effect of reducing participants’ confidence.
Although both eyewitnesses and individuals answer-
ing questions about impersonal facts vary widely in 
how well their subjective confidence matches their ac-
tual task performance (Smith et al., 1989; Lichtenstein 
et al., 1982; Luus & Wells, 1994a, 1994b), there are 
few consistent individual differences in the C-A rela-
tionship in either the GK (Koriat et al., 1980; Lichten-
stein et al., 1982) or the EM (Deffenbacher, 1991; Ho-
sch, 1994) domain. This dearth of predictors means that 
it is difficult to determine the degree to which a given 
individual’s confidence is indicative of his or her accu-
racy. This uncertainty becomes especially problematic 
when accuracy—that is, the “right” answer—cannot be 
known conclusively, as is frequently the case in eyewit-
ness situations.
A possible solution to the predictability dilemma that 
is suggested by the present findings would be to use 
performance within one domain to predict performance 
within the other. Specifically, something like a GK 
questionnaire could be administered to witnesses in an 
attempt to predict how overconfident they are likely to 
be in reporting details of the witnessed event. Although 
jurors are poor judges of eyewitness accuracy (Lind-
say, 1994; Wells & Lindsay, 1983), they are nonethe-
less heavily influenced by eyewitnesses’ reported confi-
dence (Cutler et al., 1990; Fox & Walters, 1986; Wells, 
Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981). Consequently, they would 
benefit most—apart from defendants—from learning 
whether a particular witness tends to be over- or un-
derconfident. The confidence statements of witnesses 
who were grossly overconfident in responding to GK 
questions could then be weighed more cautiously than 
the confidence statements of witnesses for whom con-
fidence and accuracy on GK were more closely related. 
Such a procedure would capitalize on the finding that 
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individuals who are overconfident in one domain tend 
to behave similarly in the other domain. Attending to 
this fact could therefore correct for witnesses’ general 
tendency to be overconfident. Research showing that 
jurors are responsive to expert testimony about the un-
reliability of eyewitness confidence in general (Fox & 
Walters, 1986) suggests that they would be sensitive to 
evidence of overconfidence in particular witnesses as 
well.
This proposal is somewhat limited by the fact that al-
though the correlation between participants’ overconfi-
dence scores in the two domains was statistically signifi-
cant (rs = .34 in Experiment 1 and .17 in Experiment 2), 
it nonetheless means that at most only 12% (according 
to the r of .34) of the variation in eyewitnesses’ overcon-
fidence can be explained by the variation in their over-
confidence for GK. This is a nontrivial proportion, but 
it still means that most of the variance is due to other 
factors, which may include individual differences such 
as demographic characteristics (Deffenbacher, 1991). 
Overconfidence for GK questions may be a reliable pre-
dictor of overconfidence in eyewitness reports, but it is 
clearly an imperfect one.
In addition to their practical implications, the present 
findings have theoretical importance as well. They indi-
cate that there are consistencies in people’s metamem-
ory across different judgment domains (cf. Nelson & 
Narens, 1990). Although situational factors play a con-
siderable role in people’s thinking (e.g., Beach & Mitch-
ell, 1978; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988), the finding 
that overconfidence, calibration, and resolution are sta-
ble in individuals across domains supports theories argu-
ing in favor of cognitive styles (e.g., Wapner & Demick, 
1991) and the importance of dispositional factors in how 
one approaches judgment tasks (Hosch, 1994). Research 
is called for that addresses in more detail the personal-
ity and cognitive factors that are associated with peo-
ple’s monitoring abilities in various metamemory judg-
ment tasks.
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